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1. Introduction
In October 1979, the Fed acknowledged the po-
tential value of reserve targeting for controlling the
money stock and stabilizing the price level. It soon
became apparent that the benefits of reserve targeting
could not be realized with the lagged reserve require-
ment rules then in place. Consequently, in June 1982
the Federal Reserve Board decided to move to con-
temporaneous reserve requirements (CRR). An-
nouncing its intention to change to CRR, the Board
said simply that it expected CRR “to improve the
implementation of monetary policy to a degree by
strengthening the linkage between reserves held by
depository institutions and the money supply.“
1 This
is essentially all the Board has said about the value of
CRR for making policy. The benefits of CRR can be
more elusive than this statement suggests and more
significant as well. This article is intended to point
out the promises and pitfalls of CRR for the imple-
mentation of monetary policy.
2. The CRR Rules
2
The new CRR rules have been in place since Feb-
ruary 1984. Under CRR, reserve requirements are
computed on the basis of 14-day computation periods
that end every other Monday. Reserve requirements
must be met on a daily average basis over a 14-day
maintenance period ending every other Wednesday.
*Economist and Vice President of the Federal Reserve
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2 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
[October 1982].
For a particular maintenance period, reserve require-
ments on transaction deposits are computed on the
basis of the 14-day computation period ending on the
Monday two days prior to the end of that mainte-
nance period.
3,4 Required reserves on nontransaction
deposits, e.g., certain time deposits and Eurocurrency
liabilities, are based on average deposits for the 14-
day computation period ending on the Monday 17
days before the beginning of the maintenance period.
In addition, vault cash eligible to be counted as re-
serves is based on vault cash during the 14-day
computation period ending 17 days before the begin-
ning of the maintenance period.
Figure 1 illustrates the contemporaneous reserve
requirement rules in place since February 1984 and
the lagged reserve requirement rules in place from
September 1968 through January 1984. As the dia-
gram indicates, the new reserve requirement rules
are not strictly contemporaneous. Even the mainte-
nance period for transaction deposits lags the compu-
tation period by two days. However, because the
new set of reserve requirement rules are generally
known as contemporaneous reserve requirements and
3 
Under CRR, reservable transaction balances include
(1) demand deposits at all commercial banks (including
those due to banks, other depository institutions, and the
U.S. government); (2) other checkable deposits (OCD)
consisting of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts, automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts,
telephone and preauthorized transfer accounts, credit
union share draft accounts, and demand deposits at thrift
institutions; (3) less deductions for demand balances due
from depository institutions in the United States and cash
items in the process of collection. In general, CRR
applies only to depository institutions that file the weekly
FR 2900 report of deposits.
4 
Reserve requirements under the Monetary Control Act
(MCA) of 1980 are designed to control aggregate trans-
action deposits. After a gradual phase-in period, under
the MCA depository institutions are required to maintain
a reserve equal to 12 percent of transaction deposits in
excess of a minimum (roughly 2.5 million dollars). In the
MCA framework, a 3 percent reserve is also required
against nonpersonal time deposits.
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AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE LAGGED AND CONTEMPORANEOUS
RESERVE REQUIREMENT RULES FOR TRANSACTION  DEPOSITS
Contemporaneous Reserve Requirements*
(since February 1984)
*The 2-week maintenance period for nontransaction deposits and vault cash begins on the Thursday of week 5.
because this article is concerned with reserve require-
ments on transaction deposits, which are approxi-
mately contemporaneous, the new set of rules is
referred to as contemporaneous reserve requirements
throughout this article.
3. The Problem with Lagged Reserve
Requirements, and the Potential Benefit
of CRR for Monetary Control
Prior to October 1979, the Fed had been explicitly
using the Federal funds rate as its policy instrument.
5
That is, the Fed had been setting the Federal funds
rate on a week by week basis to achieve its objectives.
But at that time, the Fed decided to move to “reserve
5 
McCallum [November 1981] describes the use of an
interest rate policy instrument in a rational expectations
model.
targeting,” that is, to use bank reserves as its policy
instrument to control the money stock and stabilize
the price level.
Subsequently, it became apparent’ that reserve tar-
geting could not be adequately implemented with
lagged reserve requirements. To see why, suppose
the Fed were to attempt strict control of total reserves
under lagged reserve requirements. When required
reserves differed from targeted total reserves, the
funds rate would begin to adjust to clear the reserve
market. But under lagged reserve requirements
changes in current deposits would not affect current
required reserves, so the banking system could not
adjust required reserves in response to these interest
rate movements. If the Fed were to adhere to a
targeted volume of total reserves that was incon-
sistent with required reserves, funds rate movements
could not efficiently clear the reserve market. Under
lagged reserve requirements, excessive and essentially
4 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1984pointless funds rate volatility would likely be associ-
ated with strict total reserve control.
6
In practice, the Fed provided a mechanism for
reserve market clearing with lagged reserve require-
ments by allowing the volume of discount window
borrowing to adjust to funds rate movements. As a
result of this discount window policy, the Fed re-
tained direct control of only the nonborrowed portion
of total reserves. When nonborrowed reserves sup-
plied by the Fed were less than required reserves,
banks were allowed to borrow the difference from the
discount window. In this setup, total reserves did not
determine deposits. The Fed merely accommodated
the demand for reserves required to support deposits
on the books of banks two weeks earlier. The only
way the Fed could control deposits was by managing
borrowed reserves to manipulate the funds rate in
order to influence other interest rates and the quan-
tity of money demanded.
The nonborrowed reserve-lagged reserve require-
ments operating procedure was even inferior to the
pre-October 1979 procedure in one important respect.
The principal change involved in moving to nonbor-
rowed reserve targeting was that the Fed affected the
funds rate indirectly through the volume of borrow-
ing it “forced” banks to do at the discount window
rather than directly as it had before October 1979.
7
Discount window administration imposes a nonpe-
cuniary cost of borrowing that rises with volume and
the duration of borrowing. The more banks are
“forced” to borrow at the window the higher they bid
up the alternative cost of reserves in the Federal
funds market, i.e., the Federal funds rate, relative to
the discount rate. The Fed varied the “forced” vol-
ume of discount window borrowing by appropriately
choosing nonborrowed reserve supply. This is how
the Fed influenced the funds rate and ultimately the
money stock. However, the relationship between a
given volume of “forced” discount window borrowing
and the spread between the funds rate and the dis-
count rate is volatile and difficult for the Fed to
predict.
8 In turn, the instability of the relation
between borrowing and the spread made the short-
term relationship between nonborrowed reserves and
6 
McCallum and Hoehn [February 1983] and Poole
[November 1982] discuss the inefficiency of total reserve
targeting under lagged reserve requirements.
7 
For more discussion of this point, see Goodfriend and
Hargraves [March/April 1983], pp. 10-11, and Poole
[November 1982, Part II], pp. 586-7.
8 
Goodfriend [September 1983] explains theoretically why
this is the case.
the funds rate difficult to predict. In short, with the
post-October 1979 nonborrowed reserve-lagged re-
serve requirements operating procedure it was more
difficult for the Fed to control both the funds rate
and the money stock.
The major benefit of moving to CRR is that the
change could make it easier for the Fed to control
total  reserves.  With CRR, contemporaneous funds
rate movements could influence the demand for re-
servable deposits and required reserves, and more
effectively bring total reserve demand into equilib-
rium with total reserve supply. Under CRR, the Fed
would no longer have to make discount window bor-
rowing opportunities available to banks to help the
reserve market clear. The Fed could simply close
the discount window to routine adjustment borrow-
ing and target a constant volume of total reserves,
that is, the Fed could strictly control the volume of
total reserves available to support deposits of the
banking system.
9,10 Essentially, CRR makes total
reserve control easier by allowing the Fed to shift
the burden of reserve market adjustment from itself
to the banking system.
9 
In a growing economy, strict total reserve control could
lead to a steady deflation. To avoid such an outcome,
total reserves could be strictly targeted at a predeter-
mined rate of growth to achieve price level stability or
moderate inflation.
10 
Strict control of the monetary base (bank reserves plus
currency in the hands of the public) would yield roughly
the same benefits as those attributed to strict total reserve
targeting in this article. The difference between these
policies is that under total reserve targeting the Fed
supplies sufficient monetary base to provide the volume
of targeted total reserves plus enough additional base to
accommodate forecasted currency demand. Any unex-
pected movements of currency into or out of the banking
system are offset on a regular basis by appropriate
open market operations. By contrast, under monetary
base targeting the Fed simply supplies a targeted volume
. Total reserve targeting has the advantage
that it would not allow a shift in the demand for cur-
rency relative to reservable deposits to cause a con-
traction or expansion of deposits. But monetary base
targeting has the advantage that in times of reserve need
the banking system could attract currency to help satisfy
the need and in times of reserve abundance the public
could absorb unwanted reserves as currency, thereby
somewhat cushioning short-term interest rates. Nor-
mally, the demand for currency is well-behaved so that
in practice the distinction between total reserve and base
targeting is relatively minor.
Note that the total reserve target could be defined
either net or gross of reserves not supporting transaction
deposits of the nonbank public, e.g., interbank deposit,
U. S. government deposits, and time deposits. The
relevant issues in this case are analogous to those dis-
cussed above with respect to total reserve versus mone-
tary base targeting.
Fama [January 1980] contains a useful theoretical dis-
cussion of both total reserve control and monetary base
control.
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The major benefit of strict total reserve control is
that it can enable the Fed to manage the money
stock without concern for either the funds rate or the
demand for borrowed reserves. Banks have an incen-
tive to economize on non-interest-earning excess re-
serves, i.e., reserves held above legal requirements, at
all but very low interest rates. By strictly controlling
total reserves, the Fed can exercise control of aggre-
gate deposits by exploiting the banking system’s in-
centive to economize on excess reserves, Formally, if
multip1ier.
11 The banking system’s well-defined de-
mand for excess reserves translates into a well-
defined and reasonably stable money multiplier.
Under CRR, the Fed can exploit the money multi-
plier to control aggregate deposits by simply exer-
cising strict total reserve control. In turn, total
reserve and money stock control can stabilize the
price level.
5. Historical Evidence on the Feasibility of
Total Reserve Targeting
In addition, strict total reserve control yields the
following important benefits. First, it frees the Fed
from having to choose a path for the Federal funds
rate from one week to the next. When the Fed makes
policy by choosing the level of the Federal funds rate
as it has traditionally done, the Fed must decide to
raise the Federal funds rate in order to maintain
control of total reserves and the money stock when
credit demands put upward pressure on interest rates.
Since these decisions are always the focus of national
debate, they are very difficult for the Fed to make at
all, let alone with appropriate timing. By contrast,
if the Fed adopted strict total reserve control, it
could maintain control of the money stock and the
price level precisely because it would not be put in a
position of having to continually make politically
sensitive decisions. Moreover, such a policy would
also leave interest rates free to adjust automatically
to regulate, and coordinate intertemporal production,
consumption, saving, and investment decisions in the
economy.
A Fed move to total reserve targeting seems to
have been delayed by doubt that the banking system
would be able to manage its reserve position at all if
the Fed did not routinely make reserves available on
demand at a temporarily stabilized Federal funds rate
or through the discount window. However, historical
evidence suggests that such doubt is unwarranted.
For example, for roughly 30 years immediately prior
to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System
in 1914, the United States was on a gold standard.
The monetary base was ultimately determined by fac-
tors affecting the U. S. balance of payments and the
world supply and demand for gold. For this reason
the monetary base was largely predetermined on a
weekly or monthly basis and could not respond im-
mediately to reserve market conditions. The portion
of the monetary base available to serve as bank re-
serves was the residual after the demand for currency
was satisfied. Apart from periods of panic, the de-
mand for currency was relatively stable, and there-
fore the stock of bank reserves (total reserves) was
largely predetermined on a weekly or monthly basis
as it would be today with strict total reserve tar-
geting.
13
Second, in coming years political pressure to keep
interest rates down in order to help finance large
Federal government budget deficits could become a
particular problem. Such pressure amounts to an
During this period, the United States did not have
a central bank. Yet banking, including reserve man-
agement, was carried out effectively throughout the
period. The overnight call money rate, a rate roughly
equivalent to today’s Federal funds rate, did not dis-
12 
See Auernheimer [May/June 1974] and references con-
tained therein for theoretical discussions of the revenue
from money creation.
11 
Goodfriend [January/February 1982] contains a more
general discussion of money stock determination.
13 
For a general discussion of the monetary history of
this period, see Friedman and Schwartz [1963], Chap. 3.
effort to shift financing of government expenditure
from explicitly legislated taxes and borrowing to the
Federal Reserve inflation tax.
12 Strict total reserve
control offers good protection against such pressure.
Third, strict total reserve control is a simple policy.
It could be easily monitored by the public. Since it
is a passive policy there would be no problem guess-
ing Fed policy intentions as there is today whenever
the Fed adjusts the funds rate. This would greatly
help the Fed to establish and maintain the credibility
of its policy commitment to control the money stock
and the price level. In turn, this should reduce
interest rate variability due to variability of expected
inflation.
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1984play variability too excessive for the banking system
to handle.
14 Furthermore, it appears that the call
money rate often moved around considerably without
affecting longer term rates very much. ‘This last
point suggests that an increase in Federal funds rate
variability associated with strict total reserve target-
ing today would not translate into greater variability
in longer term rates.
The years prior to 1914 did feature a number of
banking panics, suggesting that the monetary ar-
rangements of the period were defective. However,
such panics would most likely not have happened
with strict total reserve targeting. The panics were
characterized by widespread demand, on the part of
the public to convert deposits into currency. With
the monetary base largely predetermined, such bank
“runs” produced large declines in total reserves of the
banking system and thereby threatened the solvency
of the banks. Under strict total reserve targeting,
the Fed would simply accommodate the increased
demand for currency without letting the stock of total
reserves decline. Strict total reserve targeting would
thereby insulate the banking system from the sort of
violent liquidity crises and panics that characterized
the years preceding the Fed.
In the years before the establishment of the Fed,
the U. S. Treasury held a large cash position and
there is evidence that at times it carried out open
market operations to add or drain bank reserves in
order to stabilize interest rates on a short-term
basis.
15 Such Treasury behavior was probably useful
in cushioning temporary disturbances to interest
rates. Today, under total reserve targeting the Fed
could allow Treasury open market operations to influ-
ence total reserves available to the banking system by
targeting total reserves inclusive of Treasury cash.
16
Because the Treasury has an incentive to economize
on holdings of cash and because it would not have the
power to create monetary base, Treasury interven-
tions in the money market would be temporary and
self-reversing.
17
14 See Macaulay [1938], pp. A141-61 for a monthly series
on the call money rate and 90-day rates from 1857 to
1937.
15 See Friedman and Schwartz [1963], pp. 125-8.
16 Total reserves could also be targeted inclusive of
reserves supporting Treasury deposits at banks, so that
changes in Treasury deposits would also affect bank
reserves. Of course, by targeting total reserves net of
Treasury cash and reserves supporting Treasury deposits,
the Fed would not have to allow Treasury behavior to
influence total reserves of the banking system.
17 See Lang [October 1979] for a discussion of Treasury
cash management.
All this is important because the Fed is usually
viewed as facing a tradeoff between short-term con-
trol of total reserves and interest rate stability. But
no such tradeoff need exist for the government as a
whole if total reserves are targeted inclusive of Trea-
sury cash. Should it want to, another agency of the
U. S. government, namely the U. S. Treasury, could
cushion money market rates against temporary dis-
turbances. Furthermore, the division of responsibility
for price level stabilization and temporary stabiliza-
tion of money market rates between the Fed and the
Treasury would allow each to pursue its objective
more singlemindedly.
6. Excess-Reserves and Total
Reserve Control
As discussed in Section 4 above, the degree to
which total reserve control translates into control of
reservable deposits depends largely on the aggregate
behavior of excess reserves. Theory suggests that at
all but very low interest rates the volume of excess
reserves will be stable enough over time so that strict
total reserve control will provide effective control of
reservable deposits, and thereby effective control of
the price level.
18
Over shorter periods of time, however, the ratio of
banks’ excess reserves to reservable deposits could
vary substantially. In fact, this should be expected
with strict control of aggregate total reserves. In
such a policy environment, reserve market, equilib-
rium would be maintained by free market Federal
funds rate adjustments. Increased Federal funds rate
variability would probably increase the attractiveness
of cash relative to Federal funds as an immediately
available source of funds to meet deposit withdrawals.
Consequently, banks would likely hold more excess
reserves, on average, to provide more protection
against having to meet unexpected deposit with-
drawals. Furthermore, banks may not only hold a
higher average ratio of excess reserves to reservable
deposits, but in so doing banks may well allow the
ratio to fluctuate more in order to meet unexpected
deposit withdrawals, especially those anticipated to
be temporary.
Admittedly, such bank behavior would limit the
extent to which total reserve control could produce
money stock control over short periods of time. How-
ever, such money stock variability would not inter-
fere with secular monetary or price level control if the
18 See Frost [July/August 1971] and Poole [December
1968] for two examples of theoretical work on excess
reserve demand.
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over, the aggregate ratio of excess reserves to de-
posits would probably be negatively correlated with
interest rate movements, thereby helping to cushion
interest rate movements. Interest rate increases, for
example, by inducing banks to economize on non-
interest-earning excess reserve holdings, would allow
deposit expansion which would, in turn, help mitigate
the interest rate rise. Far from being a problem for
the Fed, such variation in the aggregate excess re-
serve ratio would make it easier for the Fed to adhere
to strict total reserve control, and thereby increase
the credibility of a policy of secular monetary and
price level control.
A higher average volume of excess reserve demand
under strict total reserve control could, however, be a
problem for the Fed. Banks might object to strict
total reserve control because it could cause them to
tie up a greater share of their assets in non-interest-
earning excess reserves. Assuming that the Fed
makes available a sufficient once-and-for-all increase
in total reserve supply to satisfy the increased de-
mand for excess reserves necessary to support an
initial level of aggregate deposits, the Fed portfolio
will increase along with the move to strict total re-
serve control. Since virtually all of Fed earnings on
its portfolio are simply transferred to the U. S.
Treasury, the move to strict total reserve control
could provide the U. S. Treasury with significant
additional revenue.
19 The Congress and the Treasury
could view the move to strict total reserve control
as a means of raising additional revenue through the
“reserve” tax on banks. Alternatively, by allowing
the Fed to pay interest on required reserves, Con-
gress could offset the cost to banks of holding addi-
tional excess reserves. In other words, this bank
objection to strict total reserve control could readily
be overcome with cooperation from the Congress.
7. Total Reserve Control and the
Deregulation of Interest on Deposits
In recent years, the Depository Institutions De-
regulation Committee, in accord with a congressional
mandate, has removed interest rate ceilings on a wide
variety of deposit types.
20 Interest rate ceilings have
19 See Goodfriend and Hargraves [March/April 1983],
pp. 11-13.
20 
The Congressional mandate stems from the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 (Public Law 96-221).
Friedman [February 1970] contains a good discussion
of interest rate controls.
become difficult to enforce technologically, legally,
and fairly. Consequently, the trend toward virtually
complete interest rate deregulation appears irrevers-
ible. Recognizing this trend, the Federal Reserve
Board has recently recommended repeal of the exist-
ing prohibition of interest on demand deposits. In
addition, the Federal Reserve Board has recom-
mended payment of interest on required reserve bal-
ances held at Federal Reserve Banks.
21
These two reforms would greatly enhance the value
of strict total reserve control. In the first place, by
allowing market related interest on fully checkable
deposits and interest on required reserves, these re-
forms would reduce or eliminate the incentive for
financial intermediaries to create alternative means of
providing transaction services that pay market related
rates. In other words, the reforms should bring to
an end the relabeling of deposit arrangements to
avoid legal restrictions that has characterized finan-
cial innovation in recent years. Furthermore, because
the spreads between interest rates on various deposit
types should be much less sensitive to the level of
interest rates, the reforms should also lead to greater
stabilization of the volume of each deposit-type de-
manded and its turnover for transaction purposes.
With deregulation, it is possible that transaction ac-
counts might contain a substantial portion of savings-
type deposits. But this should not be a problem
because interest rate movements would produce only
minor shifts over time in the composition of this
aggregate.
With deregulation, even if competition induces
transaction deposit rates to move together with
market rates so that transaction deposit demand no
longer depends on interest rates, strict total reserve
control could still exert control of transaction deposits
through a money multiplier as described in Section 4.
In this case, the price level would be determined by
the public’s real demand for transaction deposits
which would primarily depend on real income. How
would the system respond to temporary disturb-
ances?
22 Consider a disturbance temporarily creating
unwanted excess reserves. The banking system
would respond by extending new temporary loans
and aggregate deposits would rise correspondingly.
Transaction balances will only rise if prices or real
income rise, thereby affecting the quantity of trans-
action balances demanded. To the extent that the
21 
See Partee [November 1983].
22 
This illustration draws on the framework developed in
Goodfriend [January/February 1982].
8 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1984disturbance is understood to be temporary, the public
will be willing to temporarily hold the increase in
aggregate deposits as nontransaction balances. Alter-
natively, if the disturbance is anticipated to be perma-
nent and not offset by a Fed reduction of total re-
serves, then the price level and both transaction and
nontransaction deposits will rise equiproportionally.
In short, strict total reserve targeting remains a
workable means of price level control even with inter-
est rate deregulation.
By contrast, the usefulness of a Federal funds rate
monetary control instrument as typically understood
could be greatly diminished if market-related rates
were paid on fully checkable deposits. As usually
understood, a funds rate instrument is effective only
if the funds rate significantly affects the opportunity
cost of holding money. If the own rate on trans-
action accounts is legally and effectively fixed, then
funds rate control, by affecting market interest rates,
significantly influences the opportunity cost of hold-
ing money and can be used for monetary control. But
without legal deposit rate restrictions, if competition
induces deposit rates to move together with market
rates, then the funds rate may have little effect on
deposit demand.
23 In such a situation, as typically
understood the funds rate loses its effectiveness as an
instrument of money stock and price level control.
Of course, by using the funds rate to influence the
level of interest rates and the quantity of bank loans,
it could in principle be manipulated to influence
spending and the price level. At a minimum, such
use of a funds rate instrument requires rethinking its
role in the transmission of policy. More importantly,
use of a funds rate instrument in this way would
continue to be plagued with problems similar to those
described in Section 4.
8. Fed Attitude Toward the Federal Funds
Rate in the Last Two Days of the
Reserve Maintenance Period
Under the new contemporaneous reserve require-
ment rules for transaction deposits, the required re-
serve maintenance period lags the computation period
by two days. This means that for the last two days
23 The payment of interest on required reserves would
lead deposit rates to move even more closely with market
rates.
Since the interest rate on currency is zero, a funds rate
instrument will still affect the opportunity cost of holding
currency. But the interest sensitivity of currency appears
to be too low to provide a practical funds rate instru-
ment means of monetary control.
of the maintenance period required reserves are pre-
determined as they were during the entire mainte-
nance week under the old lagged reserve requirement
rules. Since required reserves could no longer adjust
to total reserve supply, the Fed might be tempted to
hold the funds rate at an “appropriate” level-during
those two days and simply let reserve supply accom-
modate the demand, thereby minimizing unnecessary
funds rate volatility.
However, if banks came to expect the Fed to peg
the funds rate at an “appropriate” level on the last
two days of the reserve maintenance period, then the
benefits to strict total reserve targeting under CRR
could be seriously jeopardized. Since a dollar of
reserves held in the last two days of a maintenance
period is equivalent to a dollar held on any other day,
banks would neither pay more nor offer less than that
“end of period rate” at any time during the period.
This would mean that the funds rate throughout the
period would in effect be fixed as if the Fed had been
using a funds rate instrument explicitly. Reserve
demand would simply be accommodated at the end
of the period at the “appropriate” rate, and even
though CRR were in place, reserves would not be the
effective instrument of monetary control. In fact this
procedure would amount to another form of noisy
funds rate targeting, with possibly more interest rate
variability and poorer monetary control than under
the nonborrowed reserve-lagged reserve require-
ments operating procedure employed following the
October 1979 move to reserve targeting.
For CRR to be used for true reserve targeting it is
critical that the Fed establish the precedent that it
will not peg or cushion the funds rate in the last two
days of the reserve maintenance period. This is a
necessary condition to induce banks to adjust their
reserve positions on an ongoing basis throughout the
reserve maintenance period, rather than wait for the
Fed to provide them with reserves at some “appropri-
ate” funds rate at the end of the period. In other
words, this is a necessary condition to induce banks
to manage their reserve positions in a way that could
make total reserve control work.
9. Timely Release of Aggregate Reserve
and Transaction Deposit Information
The efficiency of strict total reserve control with
CRR would be enhanced by the timely release of
aggregate deposit and reserve data by the Fed. As it
currently stands, the Fed releases money stock and
reserve data too late to be of use for banks managing
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24 Such information would
help banks forecast reserve market conditions and the
Federal funds rate more accurately. Banks could
make use of better funds rate forecasts to hold re-
serves during that part of a maintenance period when
the funds rate is expected to be lowest. In turn, such
intertemporal arbitrage by banks would tend to
cushion funds rate movements within a given reserve
maintenance period.
To make the procedure work best, i.e., with least
cost to banks and least funds rate variability, it makes
sense for the Fed to put more resources into collect-
ing, compiling, and publicizing information on re-
serve market clearing conditions each day of the
maintenance period. In this regard, the Fed might
encourage the forward Federal funds market so as to
provide hedging possibilities and aggregate informa-
tion to banks. In fact, such a market might grow
substantially of its own accord should the Fed adopt
strict total reserve control.
10. Federal Funds Rate or Nonborrowed
Reserve Targeting with
Contemporaneous Reserve Requirements
Contemporaneous reserve requirements are bene-
ficial for implementing monetary policy because they
make it easier for the Fed to control total reserves.
The value of strict total reserve control has been dis-
cussed in Section 4. At this point, it is useful to ask
what portion of the benefits of CRR could be obtained
with Federal funds rate or nonborrowed reserve
targeting.
With Federal funds rate targeting, the Fed holds
the funds rate within a narrowly specified target
band, adjusting the band gradually over time to affect
the level of short-term interest rates as desired. Re-
serves are merely supplied as required to support the
volume of money and credit demanded given eco-
nomic conditions and the targeted level of short-term
interest rates. Consequently, with Federal funds rate
targeting, reserve requirement rules in general, and
contemporaneous reserve requirements in particular,
are virtually irrelevant to the implementation of
policy. They merely affect the timing and volume of
reserves held by banks, the size of the Fed portfolio,
Fed income, and transfers from the Fed to the U. S.
Treasury.
25
24 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
[January 1984a].
25 See Goodfriend and Hargraves [March/April 1983] for
an extensive historical discussion of this point.
With nonborrowed reserve targeting, the Fed sup-
plies a predetermined volume of nonborrowed re-
serves and lets the Federal funds rate and the volume
of discount window borrowing adjust to clear the
reserve market. Even with CRR, nonborrowed
reserve targeting gives the demand for discount win-
dow borrowing a central place in the operating pro-
cedure. Unfortunately, as mentioned in Section 3,
both theory and experience make clear that there
are major problems for a monetary control procedure
relying on the demand schedule for borrowed re-
serves.
However, in spite of these difficulties nonborrowed
reserve targeting is still favored by some because of
its supposed interest rate cushioning properties.
Even if such interest rate cushioning were desirable,
discount window borrowing is a poor means of pro-
ducing it. When the funds rate falls below the
discount rate, discount window borrowing essentially
dries up, and nonborrowed reserve targeting becomes
equivalent to total reserve targeting. When the funds
rate is above the discount rate, discount window bor-
rowing can cushion interest rate movements. How-
ever, the interest rate cushioning varies in a compli-
cated way over time due to expectational effects and
intertemporal nonprice rationing policy at the dis-
count window, Furthermore, rules penalizing dura-
tion of borrowing at the window introduce a needless
cycle into interest rates and reserve supply.
26
In short, nonborrowed reserve targeting still intro-
duces a pattern in interest rates due to Fed policy,
but this pattern results from Fed discount window
administration procedures rather than from explicit
management of the funds rate by the Federal Open
Market Committee. Furthermore, since the pattern
has no benefits for monetary policy, it tends to drive
the Fed to manage nonborrowed reserve supply to
better manage interest rates. Consequently, even
with CRR nonborrowed reserve targeting can not be
expected to deliver workable or credible strict re-
serve and monetary control. Nonborrowed reserve
targeting simply does not offer any of the benefits of
total reserve targeting discussed in Section 4.
11. Summary
Whether or not the move to contemporaneous re-
serve requirements makes a difference for monetary
policy is entirely up to the Fed. With Federal funds
26 These features of interest rate cushioning due to Fed
discount window administration can be deduced from the
model in Goodfriend [September 1983]. The cycling is
due to the negativity of in that model.
10 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1984rate targeting, CRR will essentially make no differ-
ence. This article has argued that the potential
benefits of moving to CRR are likewise not available
with nonborrowed reserve targeting. The promise of
CRR for implementing monetary policy can only
come with a move to strict total reserve control.
Above all, strict total reserve control promises the
Fed a means of stabilizing the money stock and the
price level without having to choose a Federal funds
rate target as it has traditionally done. In contrast
to the Federal funds rate procedure, which requires
frequents and timely adjustment by the Fed, strict
total, reserve control would be a passive policy re-
quiring little if any month-to-month adjustment.
Total reserve control is consequently more likely to
deliver monetary control and price level stability. A
move to total reserve control would moreover offer
good protection against pressure to help finance
Federal budget deficits. In addition, strict total re-
serve control would allow interest rates to auto-
matically regulate and coordinate economic decisions.
Finally, strict total reserve control could be easily
monitored by the public, which would allow the Fed
to build credibility for its commitment to price level
stability.
In the years before the Federal Reserve System,
the United States was on a gold standard and did not
have a central bank. The volume of total reserves was
largely predetermined on a weekly or monthly basis
as it would be today under strict total reserve target-
ing. Evidence from that period makes clear that strict
total reserve targeting is feasible. U. S. Treasury
interventions in the money market at that time prob-
ably stabilized money market rates somewhat. But
today, with total reserve targeting, the Fed could also
allow the Treasury the ability to temporarily stabilize
money market rates by targeting reserves inclusive of
Treasury cash. Moreover, this division of responsi-
bility for price level stabilization and money market
stabilization between the Fed and the Treasury would
allow each objective to be pursued more effectively.
Apart from discussing the promises of CRR for
implementing monetary policy, this article has pointed
out some pitfalls that could prevent the Fed from
obtaining the full benefits of CRR. From the point of
view of using CRR for strict total reserve control, the
two-day lag of the maintenance period relative to the
computation period under the new CRR rules is
inefficient, because for the last two days of the
maintenance period reserve requirements are lagged
as they were before February 1984. To the extent
that the Fed deliberately stabilizes the Federal funds
rate during the last two days of the maintenance
period and banks come to anticipate this, the control
procedure will operate like Federal funds rate tar-
geting prior to October 1979. It was also argued that
while nonborrowed reserve targeting appears to be a
reasonable alternative to total reserve targeting, in
fact, it is not likely to operate effectively. In addition,
the benefit of more timely release of aggregate reserve
market information by the Fed as an aid to bank
reserve management was pointed out. Finally, it was
recognized that banks might object to strict total
reserve control if it leads them to hold more excess
reserves, but Congress could offset this cost by paying
interest on required reserves.
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